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 3 
Introduction 
In the last two decades, LGB1 (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual) rights have become the subject of 
international attention and their advancement has been approached on the basis of the human 
rights framework. In 1994 LGB rights were discussed for the first time at United Nations 
through favourable resolution of Toonen v Australia case by the UN Human rights committee 
(Toonen…). The case’s ruling stated that laws against same-sex conduct are in violation of 
human rights based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ibid). In 
2007, a set of principles that guide the implementation of human rights to sexual orientation 
and gender identity issues were developed – the Yogyakarta Principles (Correa, 
Muntarbhorn, 2007). In the European Union, same-sex sexual conduct is legal in all member 
states and is protected by several treaties and laws, such article 13 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (signed in 1997, enacted in 1999) (Ayoub, Paternotte, 2019).  
 
The focal concept in the LGB rights as human rights discourse is sexual orientation, which is 
treated as unproblematic and universal (Waites, 2009, 143-144). The concept of sexual 
orientation has been predominantly used from 1980s onwards in biomedical and 
psychological research, which often informs and structures the socio-political debate on 
rights of sexual minorities (ibid, 144-145; Waites, 2005). In Yogyakarta principles, sexual 
orientation is defined in a footnote: “sexual orientation is understood to refer to each person’s 
capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual 
relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender” 
(Correa, Muntarbhorn, 2007, 6, footnote 1). This definition conceptualises sexual orientation 
as reflexive – sexual orientation is a function of the sex/gender of the person who is attracted 
(A) relative to the sex/gender of the person that A is attracted to (B) – and dispositional – it 
dictates an individual’s capacity for and disposition to certain behaviour. 
 
Stemming from the Yogyakarta definition of sexual orientation, I use the term LGB to refer 
to issues pertaining to the mainstream discourse on sexual orientation specifically. I use 
“queer” as a more inclusive term to refer to all possible forms of non-heterosexuality and to 
the movement and issues surrounding non-heterosexual persons in general. 
 
1 I have omitted the letter T for transsexual, because transsexuality is not a sexual orientation – transsexual 
persons have a sexual orientation. For this reason, they can be grouped in with cis-gendered persons, when 
referring to issues pertaining to sexual orientation only. 
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“Born This Way” and “Not A Choice” arguments have had a significant role in shaping the 
mainstream LGB rights discourse. Born This Way and Not A Choice arguments rely on the 
immutability claim (a trait being fixed and unchangeable) and involuntariness claim 
regarding sexual orientation and then go on to conclude that, since it would be wrong or 
unfair to discriminate against people for their immutable and involuntary traits, people should 
not be discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation. The Born This Way 
argument supports the immutability and involuntariness claim by appealing to a strongly 
biological concept of sexual orientation, while the Not A Choice Argument substantiates the 
claims with a psychological assumption, that emphasises the involuntariness, fixity and 
unmalleability of sexual orientation. The central thesis of this work is that Born This Way and 
Not A Choice arguments define non-heterosexuality through homophobic terms and endorse 
an implicitly and often explicitly binary and androcentric understanding of human sexuality, 
which does not reflect the existing variety of sexual behaviours. Thus, Born This Way and 
Not A Choice arguments do not live up to the goal of inclusivity that the LGB rights as 
human rights programme aims to achieve. I defend this claim in four sections. 
 
In the first section, I explain why Born This Way arguments – and by extension Not A 
Choice arguments – have been prevalent in the queer rights discourse. In section 2, I provide 
an analysis of Born This Way arguments and an evaluation on whether Born This Way 
argument is sufficiently justified in light of current biological research on sexual orientation 
and its generalizability to all queer persons. In section 3, I analyse the Not A Choice 
argument and its potential for generalizability. In section 4, I first consider a possible 
response to criticisms of Born This Way and Not A Choice arguments based on their 
pragmatic value in furthering queer rights and subsequently reject it. Then I present an 
alternative argument based on the permissibility of consensual non-heterosexual behaviour 
rather than the immutable and involuntary concept of sexual orientation and explain why I 
find it superior. Finally, I summarise the conclusions of this Bachelor’s thesis and consider 
further research options. 
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1 Why These Arguments? History and Prevalence 
In this section I consider historical and logical reasons why Born This Way arguments – for 
which I use the acronym BTW throughout the thesis –  have been prevalent in the queer 
rights discourse. The background established in this section will inform the formulation and 
reasoning for what I consider a better alternative to BTW in section 4. 
 
As stated in the introduction, LGB rights as human rights initiative has had recent successes 
all over the world – global attention to LBG issues and pressure form international and non-
governmental organisations has led to developments in anti-discrimination, legal partnership 
and marriage equality cases, which has in turn increased the overall social acceptability of 
LGB sexualities. However, each success also is accompanied by increased mobilisation on 
the part of the opposition (Browne, Nash, 2014). The opposers of queer rights in particular 
local contexts tend to mobilise in opposition to the “global homosexual ideology” that is 
construed as a direct threat to the existing social and religious institutions, which are assumed 
to be natural and thus inherently valuable. 
 
Consequently, understanding the rhetoric used by opposers of queer rights is key to 
explaining the appeal of BTW arguments. There are roughly two strategies of resistance to 
the advancement of LGB rights, which are often intertwined in the rhetoric of the mobilised 
opposition. Both strategies construe same-sex conduct as a choice, that can and should be 
prohibited. The first, resistance based on religious reasons, entails opposing non-
heterosexuality, because it is “sinful”, “goes against God’s will” and is “unnatural”. The 
argument made explicit is roughly: if act or desire X is sinful, and so that one ought to avoid 
act or desire X, then the agent can act or desire otherwise than X (because ought implies can), 
and so doing or desiring X is something subject to their choice. Since homosexuality is 
conceptualised as a matter of choice – same-sex attracted persons can act or desire otherwise 
– it follows, that same-sex sexual attraction is sinful and does not deserve the same 
protections as heterosexuality. 
 
The other line of opposition is based on the notion of defending the nation and is utilised by 
right wing political parties and activists, often in cohort with religious reasoning as a 
response to the global pressure to implement LGB rights as human rights (Bosia, 2014). This 
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strategy construes opposition to non-heterosexuality as a means to hold on to the traditional 
values within a nation and thus avoid the degeneration of the country due to deviant foreign 
influences (Wilkinson, 2014). Russia is the paradigm case for pitting traditional values as a 
legitimate consideration for limiting the implementation of universal human rights in a local 
context (ibid, 363). An example of such rhetoric is Putin’s campaign against “homosexual 
propaganda”, that is construed as a ploy to erode traditional Russian values by spreading 
deviancy, especially among the “young and impressionable” (Chan, 2017). Consequently, 
opposing LGB rights becomes a matter of self-preservation and protecting the vulnerable 
from moral corruption (Wilkinson, 2014, 367-368). The “homosexual bogeyman” is created 
and utilised to create moral panic and further nationalist narratives (ibid).  
 
Examples of the employment of both of these strategies can be found in a booklet by the 
Estonian Foundation for the Protection of the Family and Tradition (Sihtasutus Perekonna ja 
Traditsiooni Kaitseks) titled “How to recognise the lies of the homo-movement and refute 
them?” (Vooglaid, 2014). The booklet is written in opposition to the “global homosexual 
ideology” that is construed as an immediate threat to the wellbeing of the Estonian people 
and the continuation of the state. It was circulated in 2014, the same year, when the 
Registered Partnership Act – which allows the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships – 
was introduced and eventually adopted by the Estonian Parliament (Kooselu…, 2014). 
 
As can be seen, whether the opposition is politically or religiously motivated, the 
“homosexual deviancy” is framed as a personal shortcoming and the result of choice, that can 
be and should be reversed. For this reason, Born This Way arguments, which reduce or even 
deny the role of personal choice in determining sexual orientation are often construed as a 
viable response strategy to the opposers of queer rights that is generalizable to all non-
heterosexual persons. This entails that all non-heterosexuals can in principle be both 
identified by other persons as being “born this way” regarding their sexual orientation and 
self-identify as such, thus making it possible to present a unified front against the opposition. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, BTW arguments in LGB discourse rely on the 
immutability claim regarding sexual orientation. Immutability claim about a trait construes 
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the trait as fixed and unmalleable2. By doing so, BTW arguments draw on basic intuitions of 
fairness and the basic argument structure of BTW can be formulated in this way: if trait X is 
not freely chosen by the individual A and A cannot change it by merely choosing to do so, 
then trait X is not under the immediate control of A – A cannot help exhibiting trait X. If A 
cannot help exhibiting trait X, then A should not be blamed and discriminated for trait X 
(ought implies can). According to attribution theory, which is often cited as an explanation of 
these intuitions of fairness (Hegarty, 2010, 5), if the stigmatised trait can be attributed to 
factors not controlled by the individual, then it is likely to elicit “positive” emotions such as 
pity in non-stigmatised individuals (Weiner et al, 1988). Thus, BTW arguments (but also Not 
a Choice arguments) have seemed to be effective in promoting the cause of queer rights (at 
least against the opposition described above), because of their potential to stir up intuitions of 
fairness and emotions such as pity towards stigmatised queer individuals In the remainder of 
this section, I provide a brief history of BTW arguments.  
 
BTW arguments have been around since the beginning of research on sexual orientation and 
the related struggle for queer liberation. The first homosexual rights advocacy organisation, 
Magnus Hirschfeld’s Scientific-Humanitarian Committee (founded 1897 in Germany), used a 
biological explanation of homosexuality as the basis for its advocacy (Weber, 2012, 680). 
Hirschfeld’s organisation set the precedent for subsequent queer advocacy in favouring 
simplified biologically deterministic explanations of non-heterosexuality (ibid). As 
mentioned, BTW arguments support the immutability claim by appealing to a strongly 
biologically deterministic concept of sexual orientation. Throughout this thesis, I understand 
biological determinism as the assumption that sexual orientation is largely predetermined by 
biological factors – e.g. an individual’s genetic makeup, prenatal hormonal levels – as 
opposed to sexual orientation arising through social or cultural influences.3 Although 
biological determinism has been historically used to argue for queer acceptance in many 
contexts to varying degrees of success, the US can be considered the paradigm case for the 
implementation of BTW narrative to further the idea of queer rights as human rights (Bosia, 
2014, 258). Due to the global nature of contemporary LGB rights discourse and the similarity 
 
2 No trait is absolutely immutable, at least in principle, e.g. it could be changed by using technology that we do 
not have yet – however bioethical concerns are beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
3 I understand biological determinism to be a form of essentialism about sexual orientation, which posits that 
sexual orientation is an ahistorical and acultural property – as opposed to social constructionism that defines 
sexual orientation as specific to a certain time period (19th century and after) and culture (Western). Essentialism 
about sexual orientation, however, is not dependent on biological determinism, e.g. it could still be true if sexual 
orientation was proven to be a universal psychological property. (Halwani, 2006, 209-210) 
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of the rhetoric used by the opposers of LGB rights, BTW arguments have been increasingly 
used as a basis for LGB advocacy and political action everywhere in the world (ibid).  
 
The most notable early example of BTW rhetoric in the US comes from Havelock Ellis. Ellis 
was an American sexologist who endorsed a multiple cause view of homosexuality in private 
but adopted a biologically deterministic view of sexual orientation in his activism (Weber, 
2012, 680-681). This strategic removal of “choice” from the rhetoric of LGB acceptance by 
relying on deterministic narratives, allowed the construal of the societal position of “the 
homosexual” as inherently non-threatening to the heteronormative social context (ibid). (I 
understand heteronormativity as the assumption that heterosexuality is the default or normal 
sexuality, making all other possible sexualities deviant and thus less desirable in regard to 
this norm (as defined in Gill, 2014, 98). Accordingly, I define discrimination based on sexual 
orientation as the preferential treatment of heterosexuality that results in sustained inequality 
between heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals, that has nothing to do with their overall 
abilities (on the basis of Bhurga, 2016, 336).) 
 
In early and mid 20th century most public discussion of non-heterosexuality was confined to 
the biomedical sphere and homosexuality was characterised as an illness or inversion (Weber, 
2012, 681). While the rhetoric of illness or inversion cannot be said to be especially friendly 
to the queer cause, we can still distinguish two cases. If homosexuality is characterised as a 
non-curable illness, then this rhetoric is in principle coherent with affirming BTW arguments. 
It is unfair to discriminate people on the basis of having a non-curable illness. But if non-
heterosexuality is characterised as a curable (and even contagious) disease, then the rhetoric 
of homosexuality as illness goes to support the choice-based opposition to queer individuals 
mentioned above: if you can cure yourself out of homosexuality, then it is a matter of your 
choice to keep living “in sin” or not. 
 
The 1970ies saw a new chapter in queer rights movement, this time led by queer persons 
themselves and were marked by positive choice rhetoric (e.g. political lesbianism) (Weber, 
2012, 681). However, the 1980s came with a conservative change in LGB rights rhetoric in 
response to a general rise in conservative attitudes (ibid, 682). The celebration of differences 
within the queer movement was exchanged for rhetoric that emphasised unity of identity 
within the movement and sexual minority’s similarity to the heterosexual majority 
(Bernstein, 1997, 532). The movements aim for a cultural sexual revolution was replaced 
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with narrow interest group politics modelled on the successes of the civil and women’s rights 
movements (ibid). Thus, establishing a biological basis for sexual orientation became 
increasingly important in order to justify this change in rhetoric – sexual orientation has to be 
similar to race and biological sex in order to be afforded the same protections. BTW 
arguments became especially prominent in the US during 1990s due to increase of LGB 
visibility following the AIDS pandemic and to several widely publicised biological research 
programmes on sexual orientation (I discuss the research in the next section) that were used 
to substantiate the arguments (Stein, 2014, 602). 
 
As mentioned, the BTW rhetoric has spread outside of the US due to the similarity of the 
rhetoric of the opposition regardless of the location – the opposition creates the “gay 
bogeyman” in response to the “homosexual ideology” which in turn motivates the 
identification with and adoption of the BTW rhetoric (Bosia, 2014, 258). The widely held 
belief that explaining the biological origins of same-sex attraction is essential to alleviate the 
social stigma around it is also partially responsible for the rising prevalence of BTW 
arguments (Hegarty, 2010, 4). For example, use of BTW arguments has been noted in 
Singapore (Detenber et al, 2014) and public officials have sparked outrage by calling sexual 
orientation a “choice” regardless of their stance on queer issues.  
 
A recent example of the latter is the incident involving the then French president Francois 
Hollande. Hollande sparked outrage by calling sexual orientation a “choice” in his response 
(and condemnation) to the Orlando gay club shooting (June, 2016): “it is America that has 
been hit but it is also freedom, the freedom to choose one's sexual orientation and to 
determine one's style of life" (The Local France, 2016). Hollande’s choice of words was 
reprimanded both on social media (“Francois Hollande tweets that homosexuality is a choice! 
No, what country are we living in?”) and in the press ("Francois Hollande learns that one can 
choose one's words but not one's sexual orientation", LeMonde). Subsequently corrected by 
the president’s office to “freedom to live your sexual orientation and choose your style of 
life” (ibid). 
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2 Born This Way Argument 
The aim of this section is to examine the structure of the Born This Way argument and the 
premises it relies on. In the first subsection, I give a standard formulation of the BTW 
argument and explain the terminology associated with it, after which I give the most 
charitable formulation of its first premise. In the following subsection, I discuss the main 
conclusions of the biological research programme on sexual orientation to which BTW 
arguments appeal and I will emphasise its limitations. 
2.1 Formulation and Terminology 
The BTW arguments start out with a scientific claim – sexual orientations are biologically 
based – and reach a normative conclusion from that premise with the addition of a normative 
premise. What is usually meant by “biological” in this context is “genetic” or “prenatally 
determined” (Stein, 2014). “Biological” can mean a range of slightly different things here, 
depending on the specific BTW argument proposed, but it is always understood in opposition 
to “social”, “environmental” and “malleable” (ibid). Thus, the standard formulation of BTW 
arguments looks like this (ibid, 602, modified): 
 
P1 Sexual orientations are biologically determined traits (genetic, prenatally determined). 
P2 It is wrong to discriminate against people for traits that are biologically determined 
(genetic, prenatally determined) and therefore not controlled by the individual, as long as 
acting on those traits is not harmful to or infringes on the rights of others (Behrensen, 2013, 
3).  
P3 Acting on sexual orientation does not do harm to or infringe on the rights of others 
(Behrensen, 2013, 3). 
C Therefore, it is wrong to discriminate against people for their sexual orientation.  
I will take the truth of premise 2 and premise 3 for granted and focus rather on P1.4 As 
various scholars and scientists (Stein, 2014; Bailey et al, 2016 among others) have repeatedly 
emphasised, the “interesting” question is not whether biology is involved in sexual 
orientation – it is, one way or another – but how exactly is biology involved. Sexual 
orientation and sexual behaviour that sexual orientation disposes one to engage in is a 
cognitively mediated phenomenon that involves mental states such as feelings (pleasure, 
 
4 Although some – e.g. Natural Law philosoper John Finnis – would argue against this claim. 
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pain), desires, beliefs and emotions (Stein, 2014, 603). Unlike inanimate objects and 
organisms with simple biological makeup, e.g. amoeba and bacteria, humans are capable of 
having mental states and something we call “sexual orientation” in virtue of their biology that 
is complex enough to exhibit mental states and stable psychological traits (ibid). Hence, all 
human traits are “biological” in this sense. 
While all traits are biologically based, some are mostly biologically determined while others 
are almost entirely environmental. Stein (2014, 603-604) illustrates this by comparing eye 
colour – a trait determined almost entirely by one’s genetic makeup – and musical 
preferences – a trait shaped almost entirely by one’s environment. While a person might be 
slightly predisposed to liking classical music or jazz due to being born with an exceptionally 
good hearing, their musical preferences will be predominantly shaped by the styles and 
genres that they are exposed to by their parents, peers etc (ibid). For this reason, musical 
preferences are considered environmental (ibid). Traits such as eye colour are considered 
genetic, because they are largely constrained by the genetic makeup of a person (ibid). 
Nevertheless, even these traits are influenced by the environment: the way the genetic 
sequences are eventually manifested is still constrained by “environmental” affordances such 
as the level of certain vitamins at a certain state of development of the fetus/child (ibid). 
Thus, the discrepancy between the meaning of “environmental” in different contexts becomes 
apparent (Marino, 2018, 120). While “environmental” is often used as a synonym for “social” 
and “malleable” in public context, in scientific context “environmental” means everything 
that is outside of the individual – prenatal hormonal levels are technically a non-social 
environmental influence (ibid).  
Thus, the traits can be categorised into a continuum, on one end of which are traits that are 
strongly biologically constrained (traits like eye colour) and on the other weakly biologically 
based traits (such as musical preferences) (Stein, 2014, 603-604). The salient question is: 
where does sexual orientation fall on this spectrum? The most charitable interpretation of the 
first premise of BTW arguments understands sexual orientation as strongly constrained by 
biological factors – it is either genetically pre-determined (such as traits like eye colour) or it 
is the result of the influences in prenatal environment (such as in utero hormone levels). 
Understanding sexual orientation in this way makes it an appropriate basis for protections 
afforded to other strongly biologically determined traits (e.g. race and biological sex). 
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2.2 Criticism: The Scientific and Social Limitations of the Research Programme 
The purpose of this subsection is to evaluate whether existing research on sexual orientation 
can substantiate the validity of P1 in BTW arguments and assess the generalizability of 
biologically deterministic sexual orientation framework. 
The first question that needs to be answered is: can current research on sexual orientation 
validate the claim that sexual orientation is a strongly biologically constrained trait? I will 
briefly cover the findings of some (arguably) most well-known biological studies on sexual 
orientation in the following. 
Simon LeVay’s neuroanatomical hypothalamus study (1991) showed a significant difference 
in the size of INAH-3 region between homosexual men and heterosexual men – the region 
had fewer neurons in homosexual men, making it more similar in size to heterosexual women 
(ibid).5 The aim of the study was to suggest that organisational hypothesis6 is applicable to 
humans: the size of INAH-3 region is not sex-specific, but sexual orientation-specific – it is 
bigger in gynophilic7 males and females and smaller in androphilic males and females (ibid, 
1035). However, LeVay’s study did not (nor claimed to) conclusively show that homosexuals 
are “born this way” – since the studied brains belonged to adults, there is no way to tell when 
the differences manifested. Additionally, same-sex attracted women were not included in the 
study (ibid, 1036).8 
 
Another line of research that has suggested that prenatal environment might have some effect 
on the sexual orientation of biological males are the fraternal-birth-order effect studies (e.g. 
Blanchard, 2004) – homosexual men tend to have more biological older brothers than 
heterosexual men, heterosexual women and homosexual women. The research suggests that 
the changes in in utero environment that occur after each consecutive birth increase the 
likelihood of the youngest male sibling growing up to be homosexual by approximately a 
 
5 The results of the study were not clearly replicated by Byne (2000). 
6 According to the organisational hypothesis, atypical exposure to androgens (sex-specific hormones) in early 
stages of the development of the brain (likely prenatal) results in sex-gender atypical brain structures, which in 
turn might predispose the subject to same-sex sexual behaviour (Bailey et al, 2016, 790). 
7 Attracted to women 
8 All subjects of LeVay’s study had died of AIDS – the AIDS pandemic provided access to the brain tissue of 
relatively young gay men (the INAH-3 region is so small that it can only be studied post-mortem). Same-sex 
attracted women were not studied, because the lesbian community was not severely affected by the AIDS 
epidemic, which precluded access to brain tissue of same-sex attracted women (Levay, 1991, 1036). 
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third (Vanderlaan, Vasey, 2011).9 No correlation between sexual orientation and the number 
of younger siblings or older sisters has been shown (Bailey et al 2016, 79). Of course, 
fraternal-birth-order effect cannot be responsible for the sexual orientation of homosexual 
men who do not have older brothers. Additionally, fraternal-birth-order effect does not apply 
to same-sex attracted women (ibid). 
 
The genetic influences on sexual orientation have been studied by looking at the heritability 
rates of same-sex sexual orientation in twin samples and in molecular genetics. Heritability 
studies by Bailey and Pillard and their collaborators (e.g. Bailey, Pillard, 1991; Bailey et al, 
2000) research the heritability factor of homosexuality by comparing sexual orientations of 
pairs of identical and fraternal twins – if there is a large percentage of monozygotic twins 
with concordant sexual orientations (both are same-sex attracted), it suggests that there might 
be some genetic basis to sexual orientation, since the twins share same genes. The studies 
(e.g. Bailey, Pillard, 1991; Bailey et al 2000) have suggested a low genetic influence on 
sexual orientation (the heritability rate exceeds 0) with combined male and female samples – 
if male and female twin pairs are evaluated separately, the heritability rates have consistently 
been shown to be much lower in female samples. However, the alternative hypothesis 
(postnatal experiences, socialisation) cannot be rejected in virtue of heritability studies, since 
the surveyed twins are usually raised together (Bailey et al, 2016, 76). 
 
The genetic linkability research by Hamer, Pattatucci and their collaborators (Hamer et al, 
1993; Hamer, 1999) compared specific chromosomal sequences at the tip of the X-
cromosome (X-q28) in families with a large percentage of homosexuals. The research has not 
been well replicated overall (e.g. Rice et al, 1999) – which is characteristic of molecular 
genetics due to the fact that multiple genes can be responsible for the same trait 
(heterogeneity) – although the study with the largest sample size with 409 pairs of 
homosexual brothers (Sanders et al, 2014) did replicate some of the results of the initial 
study. No significant genetic linkage has been found in same-sex attracted females (Bailey et 
al 2016, 77). 
As can be seen, the current research suggests that there might be some biological basis for the 
development of male same-sex attraction – male sexual orientation might be somewhat 
 
9 e.g. 2% for one older brother, 2,6% for two older brothers, 3,5% for three older brothers and so on (Bailey et al 
2016, 79) 
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genetic and influenced by the non-social environment. However, the precise mechanisms that 
determine sexual orientation and the extent to which strong biological influences constrain 
sexual orientation in men are not known (Bailey et al, 2016, 87). The current evidence has 
established a correlation, but not a definitive causal relationship. The evidence for biological 
basis of female same-sex attraction on the other hand is lacking.10 The current research on 
sexuality suggests that the expression of female sexuality might be more receptive to social 
influences and social affordances as compared to male sexuality (Bailey et al 2016, 54; 
Baumeister, Stillman, 2006). Female sexual arousal patterns are considerably less category-
specific towards sex-gender regardless of the subject’s self-identification, whereas male 
attraction patterns tend to coincide with their self-identification (Bailey et al, 2016, 54). This 
has prompted Bailey’s (2009) claim that women might not have a sexual orientation – at least 
not in the same sense as men.  
Consequently, if sexual orientation is defined as necessarily having a biological basis, then 
lesbianism might have to be delegated to the status of a mere preference or a fetish. This 
would mean that as far as the BTW argument is concerned same-sex attracted women could 
not be afforded same protections as their male counterparts on the basis of sexual orientation. 
In conclusion, P1 in the BTW argument is not sufficiently justified from a scientific point of 
view (at least not presently), especially in the case of female same-sex attraction. Therefore, 
one should be careful before assuming a strongly biological account of sexual orientation for 
the purposes of protecting sexual orientations from discrimination. I am not not thereby 
ruling out all biological accounts – I am not in a position to do that in this thesis. Most 
importantly, it seems to be the case that differences in male and female sexuality preclude the 
generalizability of BTW arguments to all queer persons. 
 
10 The best evidence for the biological origins of female sexuality comes from research on women with CAH 
syndrome, who are exposed to atypical androgen levels in utero. However, because women with this syndrome 
look “masculine” – what might be called a “butch” lesbian look – social influence on their sexual orientation 
cannot be ruled out. Additionally, while CAH women report elevated rates of same-sex attraction in comparison 
to general population, most of CAH women consider themselves heterosexual. (Bailey et al, 2016, 69-70) 
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3 The Not A Choice Argument 
The aim of this section is to examine the Not A Choice argument – for which I use the 
acronym NAC – and its socio-political implications. In the first subsection, I give a standard 
formulation of NAC arguments and explain how they relate to BTW arguments. I also 
explain their appeal, after which I clarify key terms, that are used in the formulation of NAC 
arguments. The second subsection illustrates the negative socio-political socio-political 
implications of NAC arguments.  
3.1 Formulation and Terminology 
NAC arguments adhere to the same basic structure as BTW arguments, but while BTW 
arguments appeal to a strong biological premise in order to justify the immutability claim 
regarding sexual orientation, NAC arguments refrain from making a strong biological claim 
and replace it with a psychological assumption – sexual orientation cannot be chosen. The 
validity of this claim is assumed to be obvious to an average person regardless of their own 
sexual orientation, such as through introspection or through testimony of queer persons.  
 
Thus, the central claim of NAC argumentation is that while the exact mechanisms that 
motivate the manifestation of sexual orientation might not be known, it is a trait that humans 
experience as involuntary and unmalleable once formed – sexual orientation is not something 
we can freely choose. “Not a choice” is construed as “involuntary”, “entrenched at an early 
age” and “not subject to change afterwards”. (Stein, 2014, 607). NAC arguments derive the 
same normative conclusion as BTW arguments, but building on a different factual premise 
and an adjusted normative middle premise. The standard formulation of NAC arguments is 
(modified, ibid, 602): 
 
P1 Sexual orientations are not chosen and cannot change (are not malleable). 
P2 It is wrong to punish people or otherwise discriminate against them for acting on traits 
they did not choose and cannot change, as long as acting on those traits is not harmful to 
others (Behrensen, 2013, 3).  
P3 Acting on sexual orientation does not do harm to or infringe on the rights of others 
(Behrensen, 2013, 3). 
C Therefore, it is wrong to punish or otherwise discriminate against people for acting on their 
sexual orientation. 
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As in the case of BTW arguments, NAC arguments make several implicit assumptions about 
how concepts in their terminology interact with one another. The questions of malleability 
and choice of a sexual orientation are not always explicitly distinguished, but they can be 
(Stein, 2014, 606). There is no necessary connection between the property of being malleable 
and the property of being chosen (ibid). A trait can be chosen but not malleable afterwards, 
for example, a person can choose to have a hysterectomy (removal of uterus), but the 
procedure cannot be reversed afterwards. Similarly, a trait can be unchosen, but malleable – 
if a person is born with a crooked nose, they can they can alter this trait by undergo corrective 
surgery later in life. While all strongly biological traits (as defined in the previous section) 
are not chosen, the relation between “un-malleable” and “biological” is not as straightforward 
(ibid, 606): having a crooked nose can be a strongly biological trait (unless it is the result of 
an accident), but it is still malleable. This is not an outright problem for NAC arguments, 
because they can be construed independently from the strongly biological context of BTW 
arguments. Nevertheless, the relation is still worthy of attention, because BTW and NAC 
arguments are often used simultaneously. 
 
Consequently, the most charitable formulation of premise 1 of the NAC argument 
understands sexual orientation as both not consciously chosen – and hence involuntary – and 
not malleable after a certain age. This formulation counters the “deviant choice” narrative of 
the opposition to queer rights that depicts same-sex attraction as a matter of trivial choice and 
in principle alterable, for example by psychotherapy. 
 
3.2 Criticism: The Exclusion of Non-Conforming Queer Experiences 
The aim of this subsection is to raise some criticisms directed at the NAC argument’s reliance 
on a model of same-sex attraction which emphasises the fixity and involuntariness 
(immutability) of sexual orientation and the socio-political implications stemming from this, 
by using the examples of sexual fluidity and bisexuality. 
 
In her survey of a hundred women over the course of a decade, Lisa Diamond (2008) found 
that a lot of women changed their self-identification in terms of labels pertaining to sexual 
orientation in between the studies. The women attributed changes in their self-labelling to 
genuine changes in their attraction patterns. The changes occurred between adjacent 
categories, rather than substantial changes (heterosexual-bisexual, bisexual-lesbian not 
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heterosexual-lesbian) (Bailey et al 2016, 56). Diamond refers to this phenomenon as sexual 
fluidity in her book of the same name (2008). Sexual fluidity poses a problem to NAC 
arguments, because it contradicts the fixity claims about sexual orientation – it goes against 
the “cannot change” assumption. Since sexual orientation is usually conceptualised as stable 
throughout one’s life after becoming fixed at an early age, experiences of sexual fluidity that 
counter this assumption are often dismissed or explained away (e.g. by arguing that these 
experiences are inauthentic, the person’s sexual orientation was x all along). More 
importantly, explaining away or not discussing these differences can be construed as an 
immediate interest of all queer persons due to the presumed need for a unified front against 
the mobilised opposition. The women who participated in Diamond’s research were often 
conflicted about the authenticity of their experiences (e.g. they believed that something is 
“wrong” with them) and felt reluctant about discussing them publicly due to fears of adverse 
reactions from the queer community and anti-LGB individuals alike (Diamond, 2008, 256-
257). 
 
Diamond had also dealt with the same dilemma – she anticipated that her work on sexual 
fluidity would be used by anti-LGBT organisations to promote the idea of conversion of 
homosexuals to heterosexuality (Diamond, 2008, 246-248). Which is exactly what happened 
– among other misuses, her work was positively cited on the website for National Association 
for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (a conversion therapy advocate group) (ibid). 
Diamond decided to minimise the risk of her research being misconstrued in order to support 
anti-LGB narratives by emphasising that sexual fluidity is not something that the surveyed 
women actively chose: the changes in women’s sexual attraction patterns were involuntary 
(ibid, 250-251).11 
 
I do not intend to argue against the claim that most individuals experience their sexual 
orientation as stable throughout their lifetime and fixed from early adulthood, but I believe 
that devoting attention to the differing experiences is justified, because NAC arguments 
assume lack of malleability and inability to change one’s sexual orientation and presuppose 
 
11 Additionally, Diamond views sexual fluidity as separate from sexual orientation: „Sexual fluidity, quite 
simply, means situation-dependent flexibility in women’s sexual responsiveness. This flexibility makes it 
possible for some women to experience desires for either men or women under certain circumstances, regardless 
of their overall sexual orientation“ (2008, 3) 
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the generalizability of this claim to all queer persons. The phenomenon of sexual fluidity 
does not fit in with the immutability assumption. In other words, the immutability claim in 
the NAC argument makes sexually fluid people invisible, and thus leaves them outside of the 
scope of the argument, as if they did not deserve the same protections as other, ‘fixed’ queer 
individuals. 
 
Having discussed the fixity claim of NAC arguments, I now turn to problems associated with 
reliance on the involuntariness claim. I use bisexuality as an example of the exclusion of non-
conforming experiences from queer discourse as a result of the involuntariness claim. 
 
Bisexuality is largely invisible in LGB discourse (despite the “B” in the LGB acronym), 
which creates the illusion that it is relatively uncommon. One reason for this is that 
bisexuality is rarely specifically addressed in the LGB rights as human rights discourse, 
because the general assumption regarding bisexuals seems to be that addressing issues 
specific to the bisexual experience is superfluous – attraction towards opposite sex 
individuals is not penalised, and when the discrimination against same-sex attraction is 
confronted, it is assumed that all problems that a bisexual person could face, can be dealt 
with within the same-sex discourse (perhaps, it is assumed that the same could be said for 
sexually fluid individuals). In other words, the assumption is that bisexuals’ experience can 
be fully understood, and be socially protected, by simply using the narratives and the social 
protections that apply to heterosexuality and to homosexuality (Waites, 2009, 150-151). The 
fact that bisexuality is often excluded from research on sexual orientation or bisexuals are 
grouped in with same-sex attracted subjects (Kauth, 2006, 87) further contributes to this 
invisibility. Bisexual invisibility creates a predominantly binary framework for sexual 
orientation in which all persons are presumed to be either heterosexual or homosexual – 
bisexuality is thus perceived as a situational preference and not a separate orientation (ibid, 
86). For example, Kathleen Stock (2019) defines bisexuality as a compound orientation 
consisting of heterosexuality and homosexuality as opposed to a third separate orientation in 
what she calls the “Orthodox Account” of sexual orientation. 
 
However, bisexuality is much more common than one might think given its relative 
invisibility, which means that issues specific to bisexuality concern a large portion of the 
queer community. Bisexuality might in fact be more prevalent than exclusive same-sex 
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attraction among women12, but negative stereotypes about bisexuality (e.g. bisexuals are 
confused about their sexual orientation) both within queer community and society at large 
make it difficult to access the prevalence of bisexuality among the population (Bailey et al, 
2016, 60). 
 
Bisexuality poses a substantial problem for NAC arguments, because while it can be argued, 
that bisexuals do not choose their sexual orientation, they still have a choice regarding their 
sexual partners, since bisexuals are by definition attracted to both sexes – the bisexual 
experience goes against the “cannot be chosen” assumption. For example, we can imagine a 
bisexual choosing almost exclusively other-sex or same-sex partners (for any reason), hence 
undermining the “cannot be chosen” part of premise 1. Bisexuals have choices to make, at 
least in principle. For this reason, as in the case of sexual fluidity, keeping bisexuality out of 
the discourse – thus ensuring its invisibility – can be construed as the best interest for 
monosexual non-heterosexuals. This constitutes the political motivation for the exclusion of 
bisexuals from queer discourse, because as just said the bisexual experience includes (or may 
include) a strong element of choice when it comes to sexual partners (Yoshino, 2000, 405-
406). 
 
Another motivation for the political invisibility of bisexuality, according to Kenji Yoshino 
(2000), can be attributed to the fact that intermediate categories are sometimes harder to 
distinguish, because “they are caught between a political struggle” the nature of which 
dictates an alignment with one side of the the conflict or the other – which seems to be the 
case with bisexuality (ibid, 391). This is especially relevant due to the mostly binary nature of 
the mainstream LGB rights discourse, which fuels the expectation that bisexuals have to 
assume a monosexual identity at some point. Since political mobilisation is based on identity 
rather than sexual orientation (ibid) – which usually informs the adoption of a certain identity 
– retaining a bisexual self-label can be construed as a refusal to pick sides or picking the side 
of the opponent (ibid, 408).  
 
 
12 While same-sex attracted men are usually exclusively homosexual, transitional bisexuality for men is quite 
common, which means that a bisexual identity is adopted for some period of time before self-identification as 
exclusively homosexual. (Bailey et al 2016, 59). Although it might be argued that transitional bisexuality 
increases bisexual invisibility, it does so by reinforcing the assumption, that bisexual identity is not a stable 
identity, but a phase from which a monosexual identity is set to emerge. (Yoshino, 2000, 396) 
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Same-sex attracted women may have a special interest in maintaining the claim that sexual 
orientations are involuntary and stable, that is, in affirming the NAC argument, because as 
discussed in the previous section, female same-sex attraction does not fit into the biologically 
deterministic framework of BTW arguments. For this reason, same-sex attracted women feel 
additional pressure to police their identities and understanding of their experiences to 
conform with the involuntary model of same-sex attraction in order to be taken seriously in 
the socio-political realm (Yoshino, 2000, 408). This in turn adds additional pressure for 
female bisexuals to either adopt a monosexual identity in order to feel welcome in the queer 
community or adopt an exclusively heterosexual identity. Their male counterparts are 
however not in a better position – since transitional bisexuality is common among men and 
there are relatively few male bisexuals, their experiences are at risk of being dismissed as 
unwillingness to accept their homosexuality. The same is most likely true regarding sexually 
fluid men. 
 
In conclusion of this section, on the one hand NAC arguments seem as an improvement on 
BTW arguments – they do not rely on scientific claims that cannot yet be substantiated, and 
they should in principle be applicable to same-sex attracted females. However, NAC 
arguments end up excluding a different, but nevertheless predominantly female subgroup of 
same-sex attracted individuals from the “unified front” and rendering their experiences 
invisible and therefore outside of the scope of the mostly binary LGB discourse. 
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4 An Alternative Anti-Discrimination Argument 
In this section, I first consider and reject a pragmatic response to any criticism of BTW/NAC 
argumentation strategy. After that, I will present an anti-discrimination argument in favour of 
queer sexualities that is better than the BTW/NAC argumentation strategy.  
5.1 The pragmatic response to criticism against BTW/NAC arguments 
The purpose of this subsection is to consider and reject the most viable response to criticisms 
of BTW and NAC arguments: while BTW and NAC arguments are not perfect, they have a 
good track record regarding LGB rights, namely in convincing people to take LGB rights 
seriously and be more accepting towards queer persons in general – which is the most 
important, considering that BTW and NAC arguments are mainly used outside of academic 
context.  
 
The main source of the good track record argument comes from the testimony of queer 
persons – BTW and NAC rhetoric has helped others to come to terms with their queerness 
and accept them. For example, Simon LeVay received a flood of thankful letters from 
homosexual men and their parents after his study on structural differences in the brains of 
heterosexuals and homosexuals was published (Nimmons, 1994). The men had sent the study 
to their parents and reconnected with them because of it – LeVay’s study had convinced their 
parents that nobody is to blame for their sexual orientation, which helped the parents come to 
terms with their sons’ sexual orientation (ibid). 
 
Moreover, medical knowledge concerning the fixity/involuntariness claims was strategically 
mobilised in the UK to achieve the expansion of sexual citizenship of gay citizens during 
debates over the equalisation of the age of consent. Age of consent for homosexual 
encounters was higher than for heterosexuals at that time in the UK (Waites, 2005). The idea 
made explicit is: if sexual orientation is still malleable at the time a young person becomes 
sexually active, then there is a “danger” that young people can be made to become 
homosexuals by having homosexual experiences “too early”.13 If it turns out instead that 
same-sex attraction is not malleable by the time young people usually become sexually 
active, then this justification for discrimination regarding age of consent does not hold. 
 
13 Comparison can be made to Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children campaign (formed in 1977) in Florida that was 
formed in response to an anti-discrimination act based on sexual orientation. 
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Biomedical and psychological knowledge was strategically used to reinforce the idea that 
sexual orientations are usually formed and stable by early adulthood, making the higher age 
of consent an unnecessary and discriminatory practice (ibid). 
 
Thus, the main claim of the pragmatic response to criticism of BTW and NAC arguments is 
(1) they appeal to basic intuitions of fairness and therefore can elicit sympathy towards the 
cause of queer rights and (2) they offer a simple explanation of the etiology of sexual 
orientation – people are more likely to be sympathetic towards something they think they 
understand, regardless of whether the explanation is scientifically sound. After all, the 
context of the arguments is socio-political and merely informed by science, not scientific 
itself, and some progress is better than no progress. Thus, the good track record argument can 
be formulated in this way:  
 
P1 The best way (by means of rational argument) to alleviate moral and social discrimination 
towards queer people is to use BTW/NAC arguments. 
P2 We should alleviate moral and social discrimination towards queer people. 
C Therefore BTW/NAC arguments should be used. 
 
However, there are several major problems with this response. The first problem for BTW 
and NAC arguments is that it is not entirely clear whether biologically deterministic 
(essentialist14) beliefs cause people to adopt a more tolerant view concerning queer 
individuals. The connection between essentialist beliefs and tolerance toward non-
heterosexuals is not straightforward and largely depends on the context. There are however 
some trends that have been noted and researched. While the belief that the categories of 
sexual orientation are discreet and formed along the lines of basic and fundamental 
differences is associated with more prejudice toward sexual minorities, on the other hand the 
belief that sexual orientation is a deeply innate trait, that is immutable and unchosen, is 
indeed associated with greater tolerance toward sexual minorities (Hegarty, 2010, 6). This is 
an association that has been replicated through the years in numerous studies (Hegarty, 
Pratto, 2001; Halsam, Levy 2006; Smith et al, 2014 among others).  
 
14 I understand biological determinism to be a form of essentialism about sexual orientation, which posits that 
sexual orientation is an ahistorical and acultural property – as opposed to social constructionism that defines 
sexual orientation as specific to a certain time period (19th century and after) and culture (Western). Essentialism 
about sexual orientation, however, is not dependent on biological determinism, e.g. it could still be true if sexual 
orientation was proven to be a universal psychological property. (Halwani, 2006, 209-210) 
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Though this research is often cited as a pragmatic reason for using BTW and NAC 
arguments, it does not actually prove that trait essentialism reduces prejudice against queer 
persons. While the research has established a correlation, it does not establish a causal 
relationship between essentialist beliefs and acceptance of non-heterosexual lifestyles. The 
possibility that the relationship might be the other way around – the acceptance of queer 
sexualities is the cause of essentialist beliefs about the etiology of sexual orientation – cannot 
be effectively ruled out (Stein, 2014, 623-624). The situation is the same regarding the 
possibility that there might be a third factor that is the root of the correlation (ibid, 624). 
Additionally, Hegarty (2010) found that when biologically deterministic accounts of sexual 
orientation were not discussed during a university course on sexual orientation, and were 
instead replaced by discussions of social constructionist theories on sexual orientation, which 
questioned the discreetness of sexual orientation categories and incorporated a discussion of 
sexual fluidity and bisexuality, the attitudes of (predominantly female) students still saw a 
positive – i.e. queer-friendly – change by the end of the course (ibid). 
 
A related issue is that relying on immutability is problematic in and of itself. The legal 
systems in most countries prohibit behaviour that might be shown to have a strongly 
biological basis – e.g. if an individual’s tendency towards murdering other people were 
shown to be strongly constrained by their genetic makeup and thus involuntary, it is 
unreasonable to expect that the law would permit such behaviour (Gill, 2014, 94). On the 
other hand, there are laws that protect dispositions that are not necessarily immutable, 
although they might be experienced as deeply important parts of an individual’s personality 
(similarly to sexual orientation) (ibid, 94-95). The rights to political and religious freedom 
among others are afforded such protections. Therefore, immutability claims are neither 
sufficient nor necessary to support laws that protect individual rights, such as those of queer 
individuals. 
 
The second, more worrying problem, is that emphasising the etiology of sexual orientation 
and appealing to its involuntariness instead of focusing on positive choice, creates a situation 
in which one can claim to accept queer persons while simultaneously disapproving of queer 
lifestyles, without contradicting oneself (Stein, 2014, 615). According to Emily R. Gill (2014) 
this is possible because BTW and NAC rhetoric emphasises the involuntariness of the status 
of non-heterosexuality, instead of focusing on non-heterosexuality as conduct – i.e. instead of 
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emphasising the positive choice associated with adopting a queer lifestyle that matches one’s 
sexual orientation. Recently, the Catholic Church has adopted such strategy. This has allowed 
pope Francis to appear progressive in comparison to his predecessors, by urging parents of 
non-heterosexuals to not disown their children on religious grounds and by even claiming 
that homosexual tendencies as such are not a sin (San Martin, 2019), while remaining 
ambiguous on the Church’s official stance on queer lifestyles. A similar sentiment is 
endorsed in previously mentioned Foundation for the Protection of the Family and Tradition 
booklet, but Vooglaid’s (2014) stance on homosexual conduct is clear – it is highly 
undesirable. However, he takes a “sympathetic” stance towards the status of homosexuality 
(ibid). Again, while homosexual orientation itself is not something a person should be blamed 
for, what is blameworthy and should be punished is homosexual conduct. 
 
The third and most concerning issue with BTW and NAC arguments is that they define 
queerness in homophobic terms (as is also discussed in Stein, 1999 and 2014; Weber, 2012; 
Bosia, 2014; Gill, 2014): basing the acceptance argument for queer rights on the 
involuntariness of sexual orientation and non-malleability reaffirms the implicitly assumed 
undesirability of queerness. While emphasising the involuntariness of sexual orientation 
allows to counter the anti-queer narrative of spread of deviancy among the impressionable 
youth (Waites, 2005, 549), it does so by implicitly reaffirming the inherent undesirability of 
queerness in comparison to the healthy, normal heterosexuality. BTW and NAC arguments’ 
emphasis on the (biologically or psychologically explained) involuntariness of sexual 
orientation creates an association between being non-heterosexual and being a sick, 
unfortunate human being, especially against a heteronormative background. If non-
heterosexuality is like a sickness, then like all diseases – even if one “accepts” them as 
inevitable and in this case also as incurable – the fewer people have the disease, the better. 
Queerness that is defined through a strongly biological/involuntary model of sexual 
orientation, is not a threat to heteronormativity and does not require its redefinition. It just 
requires narrow exceptions to accommodate the “unfortunate” few. While these exceptions 
might grant formal rights to the sexual minority (e.g. the right to marry, adopt), they do little 
to challenge societal prejudices against queer persons in general. Similarly, while 
characteristics like race and biological sex are immutable and there are anti-discrimination 
laws regarding them, racism and sexism are still prevalent (Gill, 2014, 94). 
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Additionally, BTW and NAC arguments can have adverse effects, especially in countries 
with low societal acceptance rating for queer persons. For example, the previously mentioned 
Magnus Hirschfeld’s strongly biological understanding of sexual orientation was used as a 
basis to eradicate the “undesirables” during the Third Reich (Stein, 2014, 619). The point is 
that the biological premise of BTW arguments has been, and may well be used, by those who 
show no sympathy at all with the “sick” but rather simply aim at their eradication, as was the 
case in the Third Reich. As Shannon Weber (2012) points out: “Whether the origins of same-
sex desire stem from a biological ‘mutation’ or a behavioural maladjustment, those who are 
against same-sex desire and love will attempt to exterminate it” (ibid, 681). 
 
5.2 The Alternative Argument 
In this subsection, I present what I hold to be a better alternative to the BTW and NAC 
arguments and emphasise an alternative strategy for the advancement of queer rights and 
substantial acceptance as opposed to merely formal acceptance. 
 
A better alternative to BTW and NAC arguments does not reference origins of 
homosexuality, since we do not have any definitive answers regarding this issue and most 
likely will not have them any time soon (quite possibly ever). Instead, it focuses on the 
validity and acceptability of queer lifestyles and identities. An argument for the acceptance of 
and non-discrimination against queer persons does not need to rely on the immutability of 
sexual orientation, because discrimination against queer persons is wrong regardless of the 
etiology of sexual orientation. The rights to expression of sexuality and pursuit of consensual 
sexual relationships are covered by the right to personal freedom/autonomy. For example, an 
argument can be made against forcing a person to go through the psychological torture of 
conversion therapy independently of immutability claims regarding sexual orientation by 
arguing, that conversion therapy is not wrong because homosexuals cannot change, but 
because there is nothing inherently wrong with being homosexual in the first place – 
conversion therapy is cruel and unnecessary regardless of the outcome (Stein, 1999, 337-
338). Abstaining from the biological/involuntariness premise does not make an anti-
discrimination argument weaker, while maintaining the respect towards queer lifestyles. I 
will formulate a possible version of the argument in the following way:  
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P1 People have a right to personal freedom, as long as it does not do harm to or infringe on 
the rights of others.  
P2 Consensual non-heterosexual behaviour is an expression of personal freedom and does not 
do harm or infringe on the rights of others. 
C1 Therefore, people have a right to consensual non-heterosexual behaviour. 
C2 (from C1) Therefore it is wrong to punish or otherwise discriminate against people for 
consensual non-heterosexual sexual behaviour. 
 
The alternative argument focuses on the acceptability of non-heterosexual behaviour rather 
than on the acceptability of clearly defined identity based on biological or anyway 
unmalleable sexual orientation. This allows to protect a wide variety of conducts, that might 
not fit into the involuntary and unmalleable criteria of BTW and NAC arguments – such as 
bisexuality and sexual fluidity which were discussed in the previous section, but it can also 
account for intersex persons and transsexual individuals (cases which I cannot discuss due to 
limited space). This argument does not even rely on the philosophically, not just 
scientifically, contested concept of sexual orientation15, because it is purely focused on 
behaviour. This a strength, because the notion of sexual orientation – at least the mostly 
binary version of it that even struggles to accommodate bisexuality – might be too rigid to 
account for the sexuality of at least some intersex and transsexual individuals and persons 
who are attracted to intersex and transsexual individuals.16 
 
An additional factor that favours the adoption of a behaviour-based argument for 
acceptability is that sexual orientation might not be as easily translatable to other cultures that 
do not have the same understanding of “sexual orientation” or relevant concepts associated 
with sexual orientation such as sex and gender – e.g. many non-western cultures have more 
than two genders (Stein, 1999, 209-211). Likewise, problems arise when a culture does not 
have the concept of sexual orientation or does not define what is homosexual/heterosexual in 
the same way (ibid). When discussing the universality of sexual orientation researchers tend 
to revert to the behavioural view – e.g. while some cultures do not have the same 
understanding of sexual orientation as the Western world, people in those cultures still 
engage in behaviour that Westerners would consider “homosexual” (ibid). 
 
 
15 Problems with defining sexual orientation are discussed in Stein (1999, part I), among others. 
16 This is discussed in Dembroff (2016), for example. 
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Emphasising the consensualness of the behaviour that is to be permitted allows to clearly 
distinguish the conduct in question from practices, the permissibility of which is often cited 
as a possible consequence of allowing non-heterosexual behaviour by the opponents of queer 
rights, such as pedophilia and zoophilia (I assume these practices to be non-consensual by 
definition).  
 
One possible objection to the behaviour-based argument is that it relies on a liberal moral 
view – premise 1 is essentially J. S. Mill’s “harm principle” (Brink, 2018) – and that will 
hardly convince traditionalists, whereas BTW/NAC arguments at least rely on a shared moral 
principle that traditionalists also usually accept – it is unfair to punish people for 
inborn/immutable traits, as long as they are harmless. While this is a strong objection, the 
shared moral principle cannot avoid the problem of distinguishing status from conduct. If one 
is to remain faithful to this shared moral principle, then it is basically the end of discussion: 
yes, I accept that you are a blameless invert, but I will not accept your right to act according 
to your invertedness. There is not much room for progress if reliance on the denial of positive 
choice is to be continued. 
 
In any case, there is a possible way to elicit sympathy from undecided persons and opposers 
of queer rights: the persuasive force of arguments that do not rely on immutability claims can 
come from the re-humanisation of the homosexual bogeyman at the centre of the moral panic 
concerning queer persons. The moral panic relies on the construction of the “otherness” of 
queer persons – they are not part of the local community, but agents of foreign influence set 
on eradicating the local traditional values. The higher visibility of queer persons can alleviate 
the prejudices substantiated by the assumed abnormality of queer individuals. Learning about 
queer people’s experiences and hardships that they face in a negatively disposed society re-
humanises non-heterosexuals and makes heterosexuals less likely to hold a negative attitude 
towards a member of their own community (Wilkinson, 2014, 371-372). For example, many 
queer persons in Russia have opted to “come out” to show that queer individuals are not a 
deviant caricature they are painted to be by traditional value moralists, but just as much a part 
of the local community and just as invested in it as the heterosexual majority (ibid).  
 28 
Conclusion 
In this final section, I summarise the main argument of this thesis and propose possibilities 
for further research. The central thesis of this work was that BTW and NAC arguments define 
non-heterosexuality through heteronormative terms and generalise a binary and male-centric 
model of sexual orientation to all non-heterosexuals, which does not reflect the existing 
variety of experiences of sexuality – for this reason, BTW and NAC arguments do not 
achieve the goal of providing an universal argument against the rhetoric of the opposition that 
all queer persons could identify with. 
 
After explaining the background of BTW arguments in section 1, I assessed the scientific 
soundness of BTW arguments and their potential for generalisability in section 2. I concluded 
that the current research does not sufficiently justify BTW argument’s claim to immutability 
and involuntariness through a strongly biologically determined concept of sexual orientation, 
especially in the case of same-sex attracted females – hence I also rejected the BTW 
argument’s claim to generalizability. However, I did not consider bioethical concerns 
regarding the biological research on sexual orientation. While some academics, such as 
Edward Stein, have stopped short of calling the research programme in its entirety unethical 
(e.g. in “The Mismeasure of Desire”, 1999), others, such as Michael Hames-Garcia have 
called all research on same-sex sexual orientation in a heteronormative society inherently 
unethical (Hames-Garcia, 2006, 79). 
 
In section 3, I evaluated the generalizability of the NAC argument to all queer persons. I 
presented it as a weaker formulation of the BTW argument, because while it adheres to the 
same structure and makes the same claims about sexual orientation (immutable and 
involuntary), it does not rely on biological determinism and instead validates the claim by 
appealing to introspective evidence and the testimony of queer persons. I argued, that despite 
its advantage in regard to the BTW arguments, the NAC argument fails the generalizability 
criterion, because there are queer experiences that go against the immutability claim (sexual 
fluidity) and the involuntariness claim (bisexuality). While I argued that NAC arguments – 
and by extension BTW arguments – are partly responsible for the continued binarity of the 
mainstream LGB rights discourse and the silencing of non-conforming experiences in queer 
discourse, I did not discuss other factors that contribute to this. For example, a discussion of 
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the “homonormativity” of mainstream LGB discourse was left outside of the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
In the fourth section of the thesis, I considered a BTW/NAC response to criticisms based on 
the assumed good track record of the arguments. I rejected the response based on pragmatic 
value of BTW/NAC arguments, because the causal relationship between 
immutability/involuntariness beliefs regarding sexual orientation and tolerance towards non-
heterosexuals is not sufficiently proven and can be attributed to alternative explanations. 
Additionally, I argued that BTW/NAC arguments implicitly confirm the undesirability of 
non-heterosexuality and cannot overcome the status versus conduct distinction – while the 
opposers of queer lifestyles might concede that the status of sexual orientation is involuntary 
and immutable and thus non-heterosexuals are not to blame for their sexual orientation, they 
can still consistently oppose queer lifestyles, which are based on adoption of queer identities 
and positive choice.  
 
Building on the criticism of the good track record argument, I presented an alternative 
argument for the acceptance of queer sexualities based on the personal freedom to engage in 
consensual non-heterosexual behaviour, that is not susceptible to the status versus conduct 
distinction. While the behaviour-based argument I presented does not rely on both 
philosophically and scientifically contested concept of sexual orientation and thus has several 
advantages in regard to it (such as greater potential for generalizability), I did not question 
the usefulness of the distinction between sexual orientation and sexual identity in this thesis. I 
also did not consider the role of choice in determining sexual orientation. An interesting 
analysis of these issues could be provided, for example on the basis of William S. 
Wilkerson’s fusion theory (Ambiguity and Sexuality, 2007) and his argument regarding the 
role of interpretation in determining sexual orientation (Wilkinson, 2009). 
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QUEER-SEKSUAALSUSTE AKTSEPTEERIMISE TOETUSEKS ESITATUD 
ARGUMENTSIDE “SELLISENA SÜNDINUD” JA “EI OLE VALIK” KRIITILINE 
ANALÜÜS 
Resümee 
Viimaste aastakümnete jooksul on LGB probleemid pälvinud aina rohkem rahvusvahelist 
tähelepanu, mis on  samas aga osutunud ka LGB vastase mobiliseerumise katalüsaatoriks 
(Browne, Nash, 2014). LGB vastaste retoorika tuumaks on mitte-heteroseksuaalsuse (ehk 
queer-seksuaalsuste) kujutamine hälbelise ja ühiskonnale kahjuliku valikuna (nt Vooglaid, 
2014). „Sellisena sündinud“ ja „Ei ole valik“ argumendid mitte-heteroseksuaalsuste 
aktsepteerimise toetuseks põhinevad muutumatuse ja tahtmatuse väitel seksuaalse 
orientatsiooni kohta. Seeläbi apelleerivad need argumendid üldisele arusaamale õiglusest: kui 
teatud omadus ei ole inimese kontrolli all ning seda isikuomadust ei ole võimalik inimese 
enda vabast tahtest lähtuvalt (või ka välise sekkumise abil) muuta, siis ei ole kõne all oleva 
isiku selle omaduse eest süüdistamine ja karistamine õigustatud. Seetõttu on „Nii sündinud“ 
ja „Ei ole valik“ argumendid muutunud osaks peavoolu LGB retoorikast – eeldatavasti 
suudavad need argumendid pakkuda vastuväidet LGB vastaste retoorikale kõigi mitte-
heteroseksuaalsete isikute seisukohast. 
 
Selle Bakalaureusetöö keskne väide on, et “Sellisena sündinud” ja “Ei ole valik” argumendid 
määratlevad mitte-heteroseksuaalsust homofoobse raamistiku abil ning edendavad seeläbi 
implitsiitselt – ja tihti ka eksplitsiitselt – binaarset ja androtsentrislikku arusaama 
inimseksuaalsusest, mis ei peegelda olemasolevate seksuaalsete praktikate mitmekesisust. 
Kaitsen seda väidet neljas peatükis. Esimeses neist annan põgusa ülevaate „Nii sündinud“ (ja 
„Ei ole valik“) argumentide kontekstist ja ajaloost. Teises peatükis analüüsin „Nii sündinud“ 
argumendi laiendavust kõigile mitte-heteroseksuaalsetele isikutele. Kolmandas peatükis 
peatükis hindan „Ei ole valik“ argumendi laiendatavust ning selle sotsio-poliitilisi 
implikatsioone. Neljandas peatükis kaalun vastuväidet „Nii sündinud“ ja „Ei ole valik“ 
argumentide kriitikale („head tulemused“). Peale seda esitan alternatiivse, käitumise 
lubatavusel põhineva argumendi queer-seksuaalsuste aktsepteerimise toetuseks ning toon 
välja selle eelised „Nii sündinud“ ja „Ei ole valik“ argumentide suhtes. 
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